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A tunnel that can't read what it carries

Run an agent next to your service. It dials out to a goTLS relay, which hands it every connection for the names you hold. No inbound port, no public IP, no port-forwarding. The relay peeks only at the SNI to route, then splices raw bytes. It terminates no TLS, so for a name you own it has nothing to read.

How it works

# your side: the agent dials out over QUIC (UDP 4443), pinned to the relay's key
keyless-agent  →  relay.gotls.de:4443

# the internet: ordinary HTTPS to your name
client  →  https://shop-t.gotls.de  →  relay :443  →  (bytes, untouched)  →  agent  →  your service

# TLS ends at YOUR service, e.g. the keyless proxy:
# certificate from the signer, private key never on your box

Identities are SPKI-pinned in both directions — there is no CA in this trust model. The wire format is public: docs/TUNNEL-PROTOCOL.md in the repository.

What you get

Outbound only

Works behind NAT, CGNAT and corporate firewalls. The only thing that leaves your network is one QUIC connection.

no inbound ports

Stable names

Bind <label>-t.gotls.de as a managed name, or your own domain proved by a DNS TXT record.

one label, wildcard cert

Real client addresses

The agent can emit PROXY protocol v1/v2 towards your service, so you see who connected.

PROXY v1 / v2

Kubernetes-native

Annotate a Service with gotls.de/tunnel: shop-web. An operator writes the agent's endpoint set; it never carries traffic.

operator + agent

Limits without decryption

Bandwidth, concurrency and rate limits act on stream and byte counts, never on plaintext.

metadata only

Verifiable

Session attestation lets you prove, per connection, that no one in the middle presented a different key.

docs/ATTESTATION.md

Three ways to connect

IdentityBandwidthNamesFor
AnonymousOne shared budget across all anonymous tunnels (default 100 kbit/s), optional proof-of-workManaged -t.gotls.de onlyTrying it out
Enrolled (one-time token)Per-account limitsNames granted to the accountOnboarding without sharing a key
Registered client identityNot bandwidth limited unless the account sets a cap; stream, rate and binding limits still applyNames granted to the accountProduction and long-running agents

A client identity is just a keypair: the relay stores the SHA-256 of the public key (the SPKI pin) next to the account and its names. The private key never leaves your machine.

Read this before exposing a confidential workload

Custom domain: the key is yours, the relay cannot read the traffic.

Managed -t.gotls.de name: the certificate is the *.gotls.de wildcard, whose key the gotls.de signer holds, and the relay is on the path. The provider is therefore technically able to terminate that traffic, and no certificate-based control can detect it. Session attestation can; for anything confidential, bring your own domain. See docs/TUNNEL-ARCHITECTURE.md §4.4 and §4.6.

Get connected

# identity: a keypair you generate, the relay learns only its hash
openssl req -x509 -newkey ed25519 -nodes -days 3650 -subj /CN=my-agent \
  -keyout agent.key -out agent.crt
openssl x509 -in agent.crt -pubkey -noout | openssl pkey -pubin -outform der \
  | sha256sum   # → send this pin to the relay operator

AGENT_RELAY=relay.gotls.de:4443  AGENT_RELAY_PIN=<relay pin> \
AGENT_CERT=agent.crt  AGENT_KEY=agent.key \
ENDPOINT_0_NAME=shop-t.gotls.de  ENDPOINT_0_TARGET=127.0.0.1:8443 \
  keyless-agent