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A tunnel that can't read what it carries
Run an agent next to your service. It dials out to a goTLS relay, which hands it every connection for the names you hold. No inbound port, no public IP, no port-forwarding. The relay peeks only at the SNI to route, then splices raw bytes. It terminates no TLS, so for a name you own it has nothing to read.
How it works
# your side: the agent dials out over QUIC (UDP 4443), pinned to the relay's key keyless-agent → relay.gotls.de:4443 # the internet: ordinary HTTPS to your name client → https://shop-t.gotls.de → relay :443 → (bytes, untouched) → agent → your service # TLS ends at YOUR service, e.g. the keyless proxy: # certificate from the signer, private key never on your box
Identities are SPKI-pinned in both directions — there is no CA in this trust model. The wire format is public: docs/TUNNEL-PROTOCOL.md in the repository.
What you get
Outbound only
Works behind NAT, CGNAT and corporate firewalls. The only thing that leaves your network is one QUIC connection.
no inbound portsStable names
Bind <label>-t.gotls.de as a managed name, or your own domain proved by a DNS TXT record.
one label, wildcard certReal client addresses
The agent can emit PROXY protocol v1/v2 towards your service, so you see who connected.
PROXY v1 / v2Kubernetes-native
Annotate a Service with gotls.de/tunnel: shop-web. An operator writes the agent's endpoint set; it never carries traffic.
operator + agentLimits without decryption
Bandwidth, concurrency and rate limits act on stream and byte counts, never on plaintext.
metadata onlyVerifiable
Session attestation lets you prove, per connection, that no one in the middle presented a different key.
docs/ATTESTATION.mdThree ways to connect
| Identity | Bandwidth | Names | For |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anonymous | One shared budget across all anonymous tunnels (default 100 kbit/s), optional proof-of-work | Managed -t.gotls.de only | Trying it out |
| Enrolled (one-time token) | Per-account limits | Names granted to the account | Onboarding without sharing a key |
| Registered client identity | Not bandwidth limited unless the account sets a cap; stream, rate and binding limits still apply | Names granted to the account | Production and long-running agents |
A client identity is just a keypair: the relay stores the SHA-256 of the public key (the SPKI pin) next to the account and its names. The private key never leaves your machine.
Read this before exposing a confidential workload
Custom domain: the key is yours, the relay cannot read the traffic.
Managed -t.gotls.de name: the certificate is the *.gotls.de wildcard, whose key the gotls.de signer holds, and the relay is on the path. The provider is therefore technically able to terminate that traffic, and no certificate-based control can detect it. Session attestation can; for anything confidential, bring your own domain. See docs/TUNNEL-ARCHITECTURE.md §4.4 and §4.6.
Get connected
# identity: a keypair you generate, the relay learns only its hash openssl req -x509 -newkey ed25519 -nodes -days 3650 -subj /CN=my-agent \ -keyout agent.key -out agent.crt openssl x509 -in agent.crt -pubkey -noout | openssl pkey -pubin -outform der \ | sha256sum # → send this pin to the relay operator AGENT_RELAY=relay.gotls.de:4443 AGENT_RELAY_PIN=<relay pin> \ AGENT_CERT=agent.crt AGENT_KEY=agent.key \ ENDPOINT_0_NAME=shop-t.gotls.de ENDPOINT_0_TARGET=127.0.0.1:8443 \ keyless-agent